Product liability, entry incentives and market structure
Stephen F. Hamiltona, David L. Sundingb
a

Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Arizona, Economics Building 23,
Tucson, AZ 85721, USA
b

Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California at Berkeley,
207 Giannini Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA

Abstract
The article characterizes the entry incentives provided by increases in product liability under
various forms of competition. It is demonstrated that the entry of small, high-cost ﬁrms is likely to
occur in imperfectly competitive markets when the average damage increases with industry output.
Special cases are considered, including Cournot–Nash oligopoly and dominant ﬁrm-competitive
fringe.

1. Introduction
The impact of product liability rules on market equilibrium is a central question in the
economics of law. Indeed, a great deal of debate has focused on the observed structural
changes in hazardous product industries that undergo an increased exposure to liability. At
the center of this question is the empirical ﬁnding that the average scale of ﬁrms in hazardous
product industries declined and de novo entry of small ﬁrms occurred in the 1967–1980
period of rapid changes in liability law. In one signiﬁcant article, Ringleb & Wiggins (1990)
examined a wide range of hazardous industries and found that increases in potential liability
are linked to substantial increases in the number of small ﬁrms operating in these sectors.
Our goal is to provide a simple, yet general, exposition of the market structure implications of increased producer exposure to liability. We characterize entry incentives in a variety
of settings for the case where the extent of producer liability is determined by total industry

output of a hazardous substance. This case encompasses some important real-life situations.
One signiﬁcant example is the case of liability for hazardous products such as cigarettes or
pharmaceuticals (the synthetic estrogen diethylstilbestrol [DES] and the childhood diptheriapertussis-tetanus [DPT] vaccine being prime examples), where it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to allocate responsibility for individual injuries among companies. Another good
example is the case of environmental health risk, where public health is affected by the total
amount of some toxic substance. In such instances, the courts have increasingly turned
toward the use of proportional liability rules.1
The assumption of proportional liability is also related to the burden of traditional
regulation. Firms with larger facilities bear proportionally higher costs of complying with
environmental and safety regulations than smaller ﬁrms. For example, ﬁrms with larger
facilities face higher potential costs when large sites are more difﬁcult to inspect or when
more reports are required to meet regulatory requirements. Pashigian (1984) shows that
increased regulation in the early 1970s led to a decrease in the optimal size of manufacturing
plants, a ﬁnding that closely parallels the results of Ringleb & Wiggins (1990) for increases
in liability.
In this article, we characterize the marginal effects of an increase in product liability for
several indicators of industry structure: output per ﬁrm (for various cost types), total industry
output, small-ﬁrm entry, and incumbent market shares.2 We base our observations on a
generalized conjectural variations model with asymmetric costs, endogenous entry, and
complete capitalization. To capture a wide range of oligopoly outcomes, including the case
of dominant ﬁrm(s) with a competitive fringe, the model allows conjectures to differ across
ﬁrms. For various parameter values of the industry demand and external damage functions,
we demonstrate that an increase in producer liability stimulates small-ﬁrm entry. In particular, small-ﬁrm entry is likely to occur when the average damage function increases in the
level of industry output of the hazardous product. The intuition for such an effect is
straightforward. If the average damage function associated with an environmental contaminant increases with industry output, a producer liability rule shifts the marginal beneﬁt
schedule of each incumbent ﬁrm downward but also makes it more inelastic. Increased
producer liability may, thus, increase equilibrium price– cost margins and create an incentive
for small-ﬁrm entry.
Our analysis indicates that the entry incentives provided by liability rules are richer and
more pervasive than previous analyses suggest. Ringleb & Wiggins (1990) and others
hypothesize that the entry of small ﬁrms following increased liability exposure is the result
of incomplete capitalization or latent risks that allow small ﬁrms to cease production before
injury emerges. Such divestiture is liability reducing when the ﬁrms conducting the risky task
have insufﬁcient assets to pay damages and declare bankruptcy when suits are ﬁled or, in the
1
Market share liability was ﬁrst applied in the DES case, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, and has since been
imposed for health risks resulting from asbestos, the DPT vaccine, and, most recently, from cigarette consumption.
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Sunding & Zilberman (1998) also consider the relationship between market structure and liability. Their
analysis concerns the optimal apportionment of liability along the chain of production when a ﬁrm with some
degree of market power produces a hazardous input.

case of latent health risks, exit the industry before injury emerges.3 This idea that small-ﬁrm
entry occurs through divestiture following increased producer liability is based on the
common conception that structural considerations lead industry output to increase with entry
(see, e.g., Seade, 1980a; Mankiw & Whinston, 1986). Much of the force behind the
divestiture claim rests on the fact that the observed entry in hazardous product industries is
coupled with decreased industry output. If industry output decreases with entry in hazardous
sectors, then intuition suggests that structural forces be ruled out as the precursor to entry.
This article shows that a decrease in industry output is, in fact, a necessary condition for
small-ﬁrm entry to occur in response to increased producer exposure to liability. In general,
entry can occur either following a parallel outward shift in marginal beneﬁt, or, in the case
of an oligopolistic industry, in response to a clockwise pivot in the marginal beneﬁt schedule
as ﬁrms respond to a relatively more inelastic marginal beneﬁt function by increasing their
price– cost margins. In the former case, increased product liability implies industry output
declines (and exit occurs), whereas in the latter case industry output declines but entry
occurs. Consequently, entry can only occur in response to increased liability exposure when
industry output declines. The implication of this ﬁnding is that small-ﬁrm entry can be
explained by more than divestiture incentives or incomplete capitalization alone.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic liability
model and discusses its relationship to other models of oligopoly and to other models
commonly used in the liability literature. Section 3 derives the marginal impacts of an
increase in producer liability on incumbent output levels and the number of small, high-cost
ﬁrms. Section 4 highlights the importance of the shape of the damage function for the
comparative statics results. Several special cases of the model are considered that emphasize
the heretofore unrecognized point that entry incentives depend on the sign of the average
damage relationship. Concluding comments are provided in Section 5.

2. The model
Consider an oligopoly model with endogenous entry, as previously studied by Besley
(1989), Konishi (1990), Mankiw & Whinston (1986), and Seade (1980a). The model
distinguishes between small, high-cost ﬁrms and large, relatively cost-efﬁcient ﬁrms on the
basis of differences in marginal production costs (similar models of asymmetric-cost industries are studied by Dierickx, Matutes & Neven, 1988, and Kimmel, 1992). Finally, the range
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Analyses based on incomplete capitalization include Boyd & Ingberman (1994), van ’t Veld (1997), and
Watts (2000). These articles highlight the importance of treating industry structure as endogenous to the
imposition of liability. Boyd & Ingberman (1994) analyze the contractual relationships that emerge between
upstream producers of a hazardous input and downstream contractors as a result of incomplete capitalization.
They show that liability can lead to sorting whereby highly capitalized producers sell to highly capitalized
contractors. van ’t Veld (1997) argues that the familiar judgment-proof problem should be treated as endogenous
to ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions, as well as to competitive pressures in capital and output markets. Watts (1998)
conducts a game-theoretic analysis of entry under different liability rules when solvency is important.

of oligopoly outcomes is described through the use of conjectural variations parameters.4
Conjectures are allowed to differ in the model between low- and high-cost ﬁrms, which
extends the conjectural variations approach to encompass other familiar forms of quantity
competition such as the case of a dominant ﬁrm (or ﬁrms) with a competitive fringe.
We consider an equilibrium distribution of ﬁrm types. Denote the initial number of ﬁrms
producing in equilibrium as N ! n l " n h , where n l is the number of homogeneous low-cost
ﬁrms, each with the cost function c l ( y l ), and n h is the number of homogeneous high-cost
ﬁrms, each with cost function c h ( y h ). The output of a representative ﬁrm of each type is
denoted y l and y h , respectively, for the low- and high-cost ﬁrms. All ﬁrms maximize proﬁt
with respect to output, and attention is limited to unavoidable portions of liability exposure
that result from a negative production externality in the industry.
To eliminate the usual incentives for divestiture, it is assumed that all ﬁrms in the industry
are fully capitalized. Producer liability from hazardous production is modeled as a function
of total industry output, and liability is apportioned on the basis of market share. This
formulation is appropriate in the case of common pool health risks such as pesticide
contamination of ground water, exposure to the DPT vaccine, ingestion of DES, cigarette
smoking, and exposure to asbestos. The proﬁt of each ﬁrm is

! i " #P$Y% # g$Y%& y i # c i$ y i%, i " $l, h%,

(1)

where Y ! ' i y i , P(Y) is the inverse demand function and g(Y) is per-unit liability. Eq. (1)
incorporates several common liability rules as special cases. In the case of proportional
liability, for example, if total industry liability is G(Y), an individual ﬁrms’ share of liability
payments is G(Y)s i ! g( y) y i , where s i is the market share of ﬁrm i and g(Y) ! G(Y)/Y is
the average per-unit liability in the industry.
The following conditions are imposed to characterize the relative efﬁciency of a representative ﬁrm in each subgroup:
dc l$ y l%
d yl

!

yl*

$

dc h$ y h%
d yh

!

,

(C1)
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d 2c l$ y l%
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l

d 2c h$ y h%
d$ y h% 2

!

.

yh*

(C2)

where the subscripts l and h denote the low- and high-cost ﬁrms, respectively. Condition (C1)
states that the marginal cost of the representative low-cost producer is less than the marginal
cost of the high-cost producer at their respective equilibria output levels. Condition (C2)
states that a marginal expansion of output does not raise the marginal cost function of a
low-cost ﬁrm by more than that of a high-cost ﬁrm. This condition eliminates from
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It is well understood that the conjectural variations framework has no valid dynamic foundation. However,
it provides a convenient way to characterize the spectrum of oligopoly outcomes, and it is widely used in the
literature.

consideration the somewhat unusual case in which the representative high-cost ﬁrm has a
higher marginal cost of production than the representative low-cost ﬁrm, as in equilibrium
Condition (C1), yet has a greater capacity to expand production. That is, while we do not
wish to excessively restrict the model by expressing the difference in efﬁciency in a global
sense, it is important to maintain the identity of high- and low-cost ﬁrms by assuming that
large, low-cost ﬁrms have greater scale economies than high-cost ﬁrms.5
Differentiating the proﬁt expression of a representative ﬁrm in subgroup i yields the
ﬁrst-order condition

! iyi " P # g % & iy i$P( # g(% # c iyi " 0

(2)

and second-order condition

! yi iyi " 2 & i$P( # g(% % & 2i y i$P) # g)% # c yi iyi ' 0,

(3)

where & ! (Y/( y i is the conjectural variations parameter. Conjectures are necessarily
symmetric only within subgroups. The model thus encompasses several familiar cases. When
conjectures are symmetric across all ﬁrms, the model reduces to cases of perfectly competitive behavior ( & i ! 0, ) I), Cournot–Nash behavior ( & ! 1, ) i), and tacit collusion ( & !
n i , ) I). When conjectures differ across ﬁrms, the model reduces to the special case of
low-cost dominant ﬁrm(s) with a high-cost competitive fringe with restrictions & h ! 0 and
&i ! nl.
To address entry in the model, the number of ﬁrms is treated as a continuous variable
following Besley (1989), Mankiw & Whinston (1986), and Seade (1980a). We assume that
changes in liability structure are modest enough to not affect the number of low-cost ﬁrms
and, thereby, to conﬁne attention to the entry (exit) of high-cost ﬁrms into (from) the
industry. This modeling assumption is necessary to preserve the heterogeneous ﬁrm equilibrium described above in the face of entry, as low-cost ﬁrms in the model receive efﬁciency
rents proportional to their cost advantages in the market. The efﬁciency rent, which accrues
to some productive factor that is not explicitly modeled here (e.g., access to managerial
talent, technology, or credit markets), limits the ability of a high-cost ﬁrm to shut down and
reopen as a low-cost ﬁrm in the baseline equilibrium. In general, we can think of Condition
(C1) as supporting an index of productive efﬁciency in the industry in which ﬁrms are
ordered from lowest to highest marginal cost. If the index is a continuum, the efﬁciency rent
is a continuous function of cost type that decreases to zero at the high-cost margin of entry.
Thus, a change in liability exposure that affects industry proﬁtability induces the entry (exit)
of the least efﬁcient ﬁrms into (from) the market until the industry equilibrium is reestablished at a new point on the continuum. For the case of two discrete subgroups of ﬁrms, as
modeled here, entry (exit) into (from) the high-cost industry subgroup occurs until the zero
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The reader should note that Condition (C2) is likely to be met in practical applications, as low-cost ﬁrms may
have higher marginal costs at low levels of output yet be operating at a scale that is well beyond any crossing of
marginal cost with that of high-cost ﬁrms. It is somewhat implausible to imagine small, high-cost ﬁrms investing
in capacity sufﬁcient to make them more efﬁcient than large low-cost producers at high levels of output.

proﬁt condition is met for a representative high-cost ﬁrm. Thus, the number of high-cost
ﬁrms in the industry, n h *, is the solution to

! h* " #P$Y*% # g$Y*%& y h* # c h$ y h*% " 0,

(4)

where Y* ! n l y l * " n h *y h * in a symmetric subgroup equilibrium. The equilibrium value,
n h *, is determined simultaneously with y l * and y h * using the ﬁrst-order Condition (2) and
the entry Eq. (4).6
The following conditions are imposed for the existence and stability of the equilibrium.
The conjectured residual marginal beneﬁt is a decreasing function of ﬁrm output and declines
faster than the marginal cost curve of either type of ﬁrm, or

& iB( " & i$P( # g(% ' 0,

(C3)

where B( ! (P( * g() is the slope of the marginal beneﬁt schedule, and
k i * 0,

(C4)

where k i ! c yi i y i. The following restriction is also imposed:

+ i " B( % & iy iB) ' 0.

(C5)

Conditions (C3), (C4), and (C5) ensure the existence of equilibrium and imply that outputs
are strategic substitutes (see Seade, 1980b; Novshek, 1985; and Dixit, 1986). These conditions are imposed purely for mathematical convenience: when second-order Condition (3)
holds, the conditions are equivalent to the coefﬁcient matrix in Eq. (5) below having a
negative trace and a positive determinant.

3. The structural implications of a change in producer liability
The effect of modifying the product liability rule can be expressed as a shift in the liability
function. Following Dixit (1986) and Williamson (1991), let , represent a shift parameter in the
liability function; that is, g ! g(Y; , ). From an initial zero-liability position, the parameter ,
represents a movement to a producer liability rule for the control of an environmental health risk.7
The effect of a change in product liability is computed by totally differentiating ﬁrst-order
Condition (2) for both low- and high-cost types and entry Condition (4), making use of the
envelope theorem. Combining equations, the system is

"

6

-l
n l+ h
n lB(y h

n h+ l
y h+ l
-h
y h+ h
$n h # & h% B(y h B(y 2h

#" # "

#

d yl
g , % & l y l g ,(
d y h " g , % & hy hg ,( d , ,
dn h
g ,y h

(5)

It is assumed that n h * is unique, as is the case when at least a portion of ﬁxed costs is sunk (see Vickers,
1989).
7
The reader should note that the existence of a cause of action under centuries of tort law means that industries
faced liability rules with positive probability even before the institutionalization of product liability.

where - i ! ! iy iy i " (n i * & i + i + 0 by Condition (C5) and second-order condition Eq. (3).
Denoting the coefﬁcient matrix in Eq. (5) by ,, its determinant is
Det$,% " *y 2hB(k l! hyhyh,

(6)

which is negative by the second-order Condition (2) with the stability Condition (C4).
The effect of the change in liability on the output of the representative high- and low-cost
ﬁrm is
d y h & hy h,
"
d,
B( ! hyhyh

(7)

d y l # & ly lk h # & hB($ & ly l # & hy h%&,
"
d,
B(k l! hyhyh

(8)

and

respectively, where - ! ( g( , B(*g , B)) is a transformation of the cross-elasticity of the
marginal beneﬁt schedule with respect to Y and , . Speciﬁcally, the parameter , may be
interpreted in elasticity form as - ! g , B(/Y( . , ,* . B( ), where . B( ! B)Y/B( is the elasticity
of the slope of marginal beneﬁt and . ! g( , Y/g , is the change in the unit liability elasticity,
which, from an initial zero-liability position, is the elasticity of average damages.8 For an
increase in liability ( g , . 0), - is negative if the change in the unit liability elasticity is
positive and exceeds the elasticity of the slope of marginal beneﬁt. Manipulating the
ﬁrst-order Condition (2) for the representative high- and low-cost ﬁrm, Eq. (8) is expressed as
h
l
d y l # & ly lk h % & h$c yh # c yl%&.
"
d,
B(k l! hyhyh

(9)

Note that the signs of Eq. (7) and Eq. (9) conform to the sign of , by Conditions (C1), (C3),
(C4), and the second-order condition of a high-cost ﬁrm in Eq. (3).
A change in liability exposure affects the number of high-cost ﬁrms as
h
h
l
dn h g ,k l! yhyh # -# & ln ly lk h % & hy hk l$n h # & h% % n l& h$c yh # c yl%
,
"
d,
B(y hk l! hyhyh

(10)

where the ﬁrst-order conditions in Eq. (2) have been used as in Eq. (9). Conditions (C3) and
(C4) imply that the expression in square brackets is positive. For the analysis to follow, it is
helpful to express this term as / * & h 2 y h k l , where / ! & l y l n l k h " & h y h n h k l " & h n l (c hy h
* c ly l). In response to a change in producer liability in the hazardous product industry, the
degree of entry (exit) of high-cost ﬁrms into (from) Eq. (10) depends on the value of the
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The sign of the elasticity of the slope of marginal beneﬁt has important implications in oligopoly models with
entry, as discussed by Seade (1980a) and Besley (1989). Dierickx, Matutes & Neven (1988) describe the inﬂuence
of convexity on the comparative statics of an asymmetric-cost oligopoly.

conjectural variations parameters, the level effect of the unit liability function, g,, and the
rotation effect g,(.9 For an increase in liability, the ﬁrst term in Eq. (10) is negative as the
level effect of the liability function reduces the equilibrium proﬁt margin and places
downward pressure on the number of high-cost ﬁrms in the industry. When the industry is
perfectly competitive, this term captures the entire effect of producer liability, whereas, in
noncompetitive environments, the degree of high-cost ﬁrm entry is also inversely related to
,. When the liability function is an increasing function of industry output, the marginal
beneﬁt schedule, B, becomes more inelastic after the imposition of liability, which reduces
incumbent output in Eq. (7) and Eq. (9), increases price– cost margins in the industry, and
allows a larger number of high-cost ﬁrms to produce in equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1: The entry of high-cost ﬁrms occurs in response to increased producer liability
when

., *

*Y#k l$k h # & hB(% # B)/&
.
B(#/ # & 2hy hk l&

The proofs of all propositions are gathered together in the Appendix.
In Proposition 1, the entry of high-cost ﬁrms is more likely to occur when the marginal
beneﬁt schedule is convex and when the change in the unit liability elasticity is large. A
large, positive change in the liability elasticity implies that the marginal beneﬁt schedule
becomes more price elastic at the equilibrium point, which, as we will see below, leads to
greater shifting of liability into price. In cases where liability is shifted by more than 100%
into price, entry can occur as the marginal proﬁtability of production increases.
The effect of a change in producer liability on total industry output is calculated as
dY/d , ! y h (dn h /d , ) " n h (d y h /d , ) " n l (d y l /d , ), which reduces to
h
2
dY g ,! yhyh % - & hy h
"
.
d,
B( ! hyhyh

(11)

The denominator of Eq. (11) is positive by Condition (C3) and is the second-order condition
of a high-cost ﬁrm in Eq. (3). An increase in producer exposure to liability reduces the total
output of the hazardous product in Eq. (11) when the high-cost producer subgroup is
competitive or, in the case of imperfectly competitive high-cost ﬁrms, when -$0. Conversely, an increase in producer liability increases total output if and only if
g ,#2 & hB( # c hyhyh % . ,B( & 2hs h& * 0.

(12)

Thus, an increase in liability leads to greater industry output when the unit liability elasticity
of has a large negative value. If the liability function is decreasing in industry output, such
a perverse output effect may occur as the marginal beneﬁt schedule shifts down but becomes
more elastic following the liability rule. For example, if high-cost ﬁrms have constant
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The rotation effect is described by the pivot of the liability function through the initial equilibrium point.

marginal cost, the condition in Eq. (12) is met when the change in the unit liability elasticity
satisﬁes . , + *2/ & h s h .
PROPOSITION 2: In response to increased producer liability, a contraction of total industry
output is a necessary condition for high-cost entry to occur.
Unlike the case considered by Mankiw & Whinston (1986) in which entry is assumed to
always increase industry output, Proposition 2 implies that output always contracts with
entry when producer exposure to liability increases in the hazardous sector. The intuition for
this effect is as follows. The entry of ﬁrms following a change in market conditions occurs
in two polar cases under oligopoly: in response to a parallel upward shift in marginal beneﬁt
or in response to a clockwise pivot of marginal beneﬁt through the equilibrium point.10 In the
ﬁrst case, the size of the market (and industry output) increases, while, in the second case,
entry occurs as the marginal beneﬁt function becomes relatively less elastic and ﬁrms
contract output to increase price– cost margins. When ﬁrms face increased exposure to
product liability, the downward shift in marginal beneﬁt creates a tendency for industry exit
(and reduced industry output), so that entry can only occur in response to a sufﬁciently large
clockwise pivot of the marginal beneﬁt function. This pivot of the marginal beneﬁt function
to a more inelastic position leads ﬁrms to further contract output, thereby reinforcing the
decline in industry production.
Proposition 2 highlights an important issue in the management of environmental health
risks, as aggregate output in an imperfectly competitive industry may be greater than the
socially optimal level while the equilibrium number of ﬁrms exceeds the optimal number.
Thus, a potential outcome that cannot be ruled out is that a shift to a producer liability rule
is associated with a net welfare loss.
The effect of a change in producer liability on the marginal beneﬁt schedule is
dB/d , ! B , " B((dY/d , ), which, using Eq. (11), reduces to
dB & 2hy h" h .
d,
! yhyh

(13)

If the high-cost producer subgroup is imperfectly competitive, the marginal beneﬁt of
production increases if and only if -.0. The change in the marginal beneﬁt of
production provides a convenient benchmark to describe the shifting of liability into
price, as positive changes in marginal beneﬁt imply a greater than 100% shift of unit
liability into price. With competitive high-cost ﬁrms, liability is always shifted by
exactly 100% into price. With noncompetitive high-cost ﬁrms, the degree of shifting of
liability into price is determined by the value of ,. If the marginal beneﬁt schedule is
linear, for example, unit liability is shifted by more than 100% into price for all positive
changes in the slope of the liability function.
We next examine changes in market share. The change in market share for a representative
ﬁrm in subgroup i is ds i /d , ! Y *2 [Y(d y i /d , ) * y i (dY/d , ). Using Eq. (7), Eq. (9), and Eq.
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(11), a change in producer liability affects the market share of a representative high- and
low-cost ﬁrm as
h
ds h *s h# g ,! yhyh # - & h$Y # & hy h%
"
d,
B(Y ! hyhyh

(14)

h
h
2
l
ds l *g ,s lk l! yhyh % -#s l$ & lYk h # & hy hk l% % & h$c yh # c yl%
,
"
d,
B(Yk l! hyhyh

(15)

and

respectively. The ﬁrst term in each expression represents an increase in market share, as an
upward level effect in the liability function precipitates the exit of high-cost ﬁrms. The
market share of a representative high-cost ﬁrm in Eq. (14) is positively related to -, while
the market share of a representative low-cost ﬁrm in Eq. (15) is positively related to whenever ( & l Yk h * & 2h y h k l ) . 0. Adding and subtracting & h k l Y to this term yields ( & l Yk h
* & 2h y h k l ) ! Y( & l c hy hy h * & h c ly ly l ) " & h k l (Y * & h y h ), where the ﬁrst term is positive by
Eq. (C2) if the conjecture of a representative high-cost ﬁrm does not exceed that of a low-cost
ﬁrm, and where the second term is positive in the allowable range of high-cost ﬁrm
conjectures. Thus, in response to greater liability exposure, market share unambiguously
increases when - / 0 for either type of ﬁrm whenever the conjecture of a high-cost ﬁrm
does not exceed that of a low-cost ﬁrm. For the remainder of our analysis on the effect of
liability on incumbent market shares, we assume this condition is met.111
The following proposition provides conditions under which an increase in liability exposure increases the market share of incumbent ﬁrms in Eq. (14) and Eq. (15). This proposition
then can be used with Proposition 1 to describe the various circumstances that lead to market
share losses for low-cost incumbents, to market share gains for high-cost incumbents, and to
the entry of high-cost ﬁrms. Inspecting Eq. (14) and Eq. (15), we have the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: An increase in producer liability
1. increases the market share of high-cost ﬁrms when

., '

k h # & hB( # & hB)Y
;
*B( & h$1 # & hs h%

2. increases the market share of low-cost ﬁrms when

., '

11

y lk l$k h # & hB(% # B)Y$ & ly lk h % & h$c hyh # c lyl%
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.

It is hard to imagine a case in which high-cost ﬁrms conjecture a larger industry response to a change in
output than low-cost ﬁrms. Small ﬁrms may perceive that they are more able to get away with undetected output
increases than larger ﬁrms.

Table 1
The implications of a change in product liability under competitive, dominant ﬁrm(s)/competitive fringe, and
Nash–Cournot market structures
Market conditions

dyh
d,

dyl
d,

Competition
0
0
Dominant ﬁrm(s)/competitive fringe with constant marginal cost
. , + . B(
0
"
. B( + . , + 1 " . B(
0
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*
nl sl
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*

*
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"
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Nash–Caournot with linear demand and constant marginal cost
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Proposition 3 provides general conditions under which increased producer liability
increases incumbent market shares. As the following examples demonstrate, increased
producer liability for environmental health risks can lead to a considerably rich variety
of outcomes, including market share losses for low-cost incumbents, market share
gains for high-cost incumbents, and high-cost entry. Table 1 summarizes the results of
the above propositions for the various market structures considered in the examples
below.
EXAMPLE 1: Consider a perfectly competitive equilibrium in the hazardous industry. In the
competitive case, an increase in producer liability does not affect the production scale of
either type of incumbent ﬁrm, and the additional liability cost precipitates the exit of
high-cost ﬁrms. Consequently, total industry output decreases, and the market share of each
incumbent ﬁrm increases. The magnitude of the industry output effect depends on the relative
value of the unit liability function and the slope of marginal beneﬁt at the equilibrium point.
Thus, liability is shifted by exactly 100% into price.

EXAMPLE 2: Consider the case of imperfectly competitive low-cost ﬁrms with a high-cost
competitive fringe. Suppose low-cost ﬁrms have the cost function c l ( y l ) ! c l y l " F L , where
F L denotes ﬁxed costs. In this case, an increase in producer liability does not
change the production scale of competitive high-cost incumbents but increases the
production level of low-cost ﬁrms for sufﬁciently small changes in the unit liability
elasticity. In particular, low-cost ﬁrms increase output in the face of greater
liability exposure when the marginal beneﬁt schedule becomes sufﬁciently more
elastic following a change in legal structure.
With competitive high-cost ﬁrms, total output in the industry decreases and liability is
shifted by exactly 100% into price following an increase in producer liability. Consequently,
an increase in producer liability increases the market share of high-cost ﬁrms, regardless of
the shape of the liability function. The market share of a representative low-cost ﬁrm can
either increase or decrease following greater liability exposure, depending on the change in
the unit liability elasticity.
Entry into the hazardous industry occurs following sufﬁciently large changes in the unit
liability elasticity. The intuition for the entry effect can best be seen in the case of a linear
marginal beneﬁt schedule, B) ! 0. In this case, .B( ! 0 and high-cost, competitive ﬁrms
enter the hazardous product industry following an increase in producer liability whenever the
change in the unit liability elasticity satisﬁes . , . (n l s l ) *1 , or, alternatively, when the
change in the residual liability elasticity for the low-cost subgroup, . l, ! g(, (n l y l )/g , ,
exceeds unitary value. The key to understanding this entry condition is to note that ﬁrms in
the high-cost fringe hold output constant; hence, entry (exit) occurs whenever the change in
industry output unhinges from the change in the combined output of low-cost ﬁrms. With a
competitive fringe, industry output declines linearly along the marginal beneﬁt function in
proportion to the increase in unit liability. When low-cost ﬁrms have constant marginal costs,
the combined output reduction of low-cost ﬁrms exceeds this decline in industry output
whenever . l , . 1. The shortfall in low-cost ﬁrm production thereby accommodates entry.
With an isoelastic marginal beneﬁt schedule, entry occurs in a wider range of circumstances. For example, if B(Y) ! AY * 0 , where 0 is the absolute value of the marginal beneﬁt
elasticity, . B( ! *(1 " 0 ) and high-cost competitive ﬁrm entry occurs following an
increase in producer liability whenever 1 " 0 " . , . (n l s l ) *1 .
For general speciﬁcations of demand, the condition for high-cost ﬁrm entry is a sufﬁcient
condition for a loss of market share for low-cost incumbents in the hazardous product
industry. Hence, whenever increased liability exposure induces the entry of high-cost
competitive ﬁrms in a dominant ﬁrm(s)/competitive fringe model, the market share of each
high-cost ﬁrm increases and the market share of each low-cost ﬁrm decreases.
EXAMPLE 3: Consider the case of Cournot–Nash competition among incumbent ﬁrms with the
cost functions ci(yi) ! ciyi " Fi, i ! l, h. In this case, both high- and low-cost ﬁrms increase
production when the marginal beneﬁt schedule becomes sufﬁciently more elastic following
a change in legal structure and, otherwise, decrease output.
For general functional forms of the marginal beneﬁt schedule, total output in the industry
decreases whenever . . *2/s h and liability is shifted by more than 100% into price
whenever - + 0. Consequently, liability is shifted by more than 100% into price whenever

. , . 0 for the case of linear marginal beneﬁt, and 1 " 0 " . , . 0 for the case of isoelastic
marginal beneﬁt.
Critical values for the change in the unit liability elasticity are presented in Table 1 for the
case of a linear marginal beneﬁt schedule. As in the case of a dominant ﬁrm(s)/competitive
fringe market structure, high-cost entry can only occur when the change in the liability
elasticity sufﬁciently exceeds unitary value. As before, a necessary condition for high-cost
ﬁrm entry is a loss of market share for large low-cost incumbents.
As these examples illustrate, the structural implications of an increase in producer liability
are highly sensitive to changes in the unit liability elasticity. In a wide range of circumstances, increased producer liability for environmental health risks induces the entry of
high-cost ﬁrms in the hazardous sector. Large values of the liability elasticity are associated
with the entry of high-cost ﬁrms and a loss of low-cost incumbent market share in noncompetitive environments, while the market share of high-cost incumbents may or may not
decrease when the entry of high-cost ﬁrms occurs.
When producer liability arises from environmental health risk, it is likely that the unit liability
function increases with the level of industry output. For example, there is considerable evidence
that the health risk associated with carcinogenic substances generally increases with the level of
exposure (Lichtenberg & Zilberman, 1989). Similarly, for ﬁrms that pollute a common region, the
negative externality associated with production may increase at an increasing rate when the
natural sink for environmental contamination is limited.

6. Conclusion
This article has considered the impact of product liability on market equilibrium in a wide
variety of industry settings. Our main result is that the entry of high-cost ﬁrms is more likely
to occur when the marginal beneﬁt schedule is convex and when the change in the unit
liability elasticity is large. A large, positive change in the liability elasticity implies that the
marginal beneﬁt schedule becomes more price elastic at the equilibrium point, which leads
to greater shifting of liability into price. In cases where liability is shifted by more than 100%
into price, entry can occur as the marginal proﬁtability of production increases. We also
demonstrate that a contraction of total industry output is a necessary condition for small-ﬁrm
entry to occur following an increase in liability.
In an important article, Ringleb & Wiggins (1990) found that an increase in producer exposure
to liability frequently precedes the entry of small, high-cost ﬁrms and leads to increases in the
market share of high-cost ﬁrms in hazardous sectors of the economy. Ringleb & Wiggins (1990)
hypothesize that such entry results from the desire of large, incumbent ﬁrms to shield themselves
from liability by divesting risky activities. Our article has demonstrated that incomplete capitalization and divestiture incentives are not the only possible motivations for the entry of high-cost
ﬁrms to occur in response to increased product liability.
The article clariﬁes the role of the unit liability function in determining entry incentives
in industries with environmentally hazardous output. In a wide variety of circumstances, the
entry incentive is fundamentally related to the change in the slope of the unit liability
function. In particular, increased producer exposure to liability is likely to result in small-ﬁrm

entry when the slope of the unit liability function increases with the change in liability
structure. Under such conditions, increased liability shifts the marginal beneﬁt schedule
downward for each incumbent ﬁrm but also makes it more price elastic. The imposition of
producer liability, thus, may increase industry price– cost margins and lead to the entry of
high-cost ﬁrms, results that suggest the relationship between liability and market structure is
richer than previously recognized.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
A change in producer liability affects the number of high-cost ﬁrms as in Eq. (10).
Decomposing Eq. (10) yields, after some manipulation
dn h *g ,#Y$k l$k h # & hB(% # B)/% % . ,B($/ # & 2hy hk l%
"
.
d,
B(Yy hk l! hyhyh

(16)

The denominator of Eq. (16) is positive by Eq. (C3), Eq. (C4), and the second-order
condition of a high-cost ﬁrm in Eq. (3). For an increase in producer liability, the entry of
high-cost ﬁrms occurs in Eq. (16) whenever Y(k l (k h * & h B() * B)/)+ * . , B((/ *
& 2h y h k l ). Dividing both sides by *B((/ * & 2h y h k l ) . 0 completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
It is necessary to show that the condition for a (weak) expansion of total industry output
contradicts the condition for high-cost ﬁrm entry for the case of increased producer liability
(g,/0). Manipulating Eq. (12), total industry output (at least weakly) expands in response to
increased producer liability whenever

., $

k h # & hB(
.
B( & 2hs h

(17)

Comparing Eq. (17) with the condition for high-cost entry in Proposition 1, entry occurs
under conditions of total industry output expansion if and only if
k h # & hB( *Y#k l$k h # & hB(% # B)/&
*
.
B( & 2hs h
B(#/ # & 2hy hk l&

(18)

Factoring Eq. (18) yields the condition (k h * & h B( * & 2h y h B))/ . 0. Recognizing the term
in brackets to be the second-order condition of a high-cost ﬁrm results in a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3
In Eq. (14), the market share of a high-cost ﬁrm increases following increased product
liability if and only if k h * & h B( " & h B)Y . * & h B((1 * & h s h ) . , . Factoring this
expression completes Part 1. In Eq. (15), the market share of a low-cost ﬁrm increases in
response to increased producer liability if and only if y l k l (k h * & h B() * B)Y( & l y l k h "
& h (c hyh * c ly l)). * . , B(( y l ( & l k k * & 2h s h k l ) " & h (c hyh * c ly l). Recognizing that the term in
the brackets on the right-hand side of this expression is positive when & l / & h , and factoring
completes the proof.
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